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Abstract  
This paper aims at analyzing the success of Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) by using constructivism, hoping to offer a different facet to advance the 
progress of ASEAN in economic regionalism since most of academic researches 
focus on liberalism. We argue that to a smaller degree has ASEAN succeeded in 
achieving regionalism because of the disparity in ideas, norms and values which 
hinders the support from the mass, the compromise for national interests, 
socioeconomic harmony and the formation of a common identity. 
 
Although ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was formed with high ambitions 
and goals of seamless collaboration amongst the member states, with identifiable 
stated goals that drives regionalism in the South East Asia, the success of it is still 
debatable. This paper aims to argue that the achievement has been limited, most of 
it limited to governmental trade and high level economic cooperation. Asia, in 
particular South East Asia, remain largely made up of independent sovereign states, 
compared to the European Union, ASEAN has not lived up to its original 
aspirations of driving regionalism. Although ASEAN is in the driving seat, most 
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evidently by the adoption of the “ASEAN Economic Blueprint” in 2007, it is 
because of historical political animosities, lack of mutual trust amongst states and 
intense global economic competition in the age of rapid globalization, it is argued 
that although ASEAN remains in the driver’s seat, and has progressed tremendously 
since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has yet to fulfill its goals of achieving true 
regionalism. In order for ASEAN to further facilitate regional integration, it can 
learn from the European Union (EU) in some areas. When referring to EU to 
develop its regional integration, ASEAN can try to develop supranational 
institutions, get consensus on regional economic direction and increase the level of 
economic cooperation among countries. In the area of economic integration and 
cooperation, ASEAN could refer to the EU model of an alignment in economic 
policies. ASEAN can also consider allowing a free flow of capital account, further 
relaxation on intra-regional flow of trade, service and capital, human capital and 
capital accounts for the next stage of cooperation and economic integration. 
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Introduction 
Despite the efforts of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
regionalism, ASEAN continue to encounter considerable difficulties and 
hindrances. Many scholars analyze the failure of ASEAN by applying liberalism. 
However, in this paper, focal point will be fallen on the using of constructivism, 
which related the issue to ideas, norms and identity, as we argue that constructivism 
will be more appropriate to explain the issue because the failure to establish a shared 
idea, norm and identity hampers the development of regionalism. Since factors, like 
the lack of support from the mass, the denial of states to compromise for own 
national interests, socioeconomic heterogeneity and the difference in identity, affect 
the development of ASEAN in regionalism, we argue that to a smaller extent 
ASEAN has succeeded in driving economic regionalism. By applying 
constructivism for analyze, we hope we can offer a new dimension to evaluate the 
entire issue so as to improve the effectiveness of ASEAN in economic regionalism. 
We have generally agreed that ASEAN only has limited effect in successfully 
driving regional integration. In order for ASEAN to further facilitate the 
regionalism development, it can learn from the European Union (EU), which has 
been considered as one of the largest, most mature and successful regional 
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communities in the world. Despite EU and ASEAN share similar idea of facilitating 
regional cooperation, their model of cooperation varies. In addition, the political, 
economic, cultural and ideology of member states in the two institutions also has 
huge difference. We will explore ways in which ASEAN could strengthen its 
regional cooperation by referring to the cooperation model of EU. 
 
Key Concepts 
The following provides clear definitions for the key concepts. 
Values 
ASEAN members will fight for accomplishing the values, like fairness, rule of law, 
right, autonomy, and currently, democracy and human rights, in the seek for identity, 
so as to attain peaceful mutual co-existence, regional strength, regional sovereignty, 
regional liberation, regional peace, coordination, solidity and affluence, that means, 
the joint aspirations for mutual objectives and values shown by the demand to create 
a strong basis for joint effort to stimulate regional collaboration in Southeast Asia 
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in the idea of uniformity and corporation, which contribute towards peace, progress 
and prosperity in the region (The ASEAN Declaration, 1967) (Layug).  
Norms 
The norms for intra-ASEAN relations, including treasure national autonomy, non-
intervention in internal matters of states, abandon of the risk or restoration of force 
in resolving conflicts (Layug), the denunciation of an ASEAN armed agreement, 
the inclination for mutual defense collaboration via non-use of military power and 
peaceful disputes settlement, regional sovereignty and joint self-reliance, will 
contribute to the formation of ASEAN identity (Layug). These norms, being 
exclusive to Southeast Asia, are significant not only in the creation and diffusion of 
a common identity, but also assist ASEAN to solve preliminary misunderstanding 
and reach agreements over the implication and extent of the ASEAN principles 
(Layug).  
Ideas 
Starting from the establishment of ASEAN, ASEAN serves as a diplomatic 
instrument in creating a basis for a affluent and peaceful entity in Southeast Asia 
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by establishing “ASEAN Community” due to the requirement of the 1967 ASEAN 
Declaration to regard this as one of the objectives and the motions of ASEAN to 
hasten its economic advancement, communal development and national growth in 
the region through joint endeavors in the belief of fairness and cooperation so as to 
fortify the groundwork for a wealthy and stable society of Southeast Asia states 
(Layug). Also, in ASEAN Vision 2020 declaration in 1997, member states agree to 
unite their effort on developing a community of Southeast Asian states to establish 
a peaceful relation with each other and with the rest of the world, accomplishing 
affluence for their citizens and progressively cultivating their livings by presenting 
ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian states which embodies openness, harmony, 
solidity and affluence to gather states jointly in energetic growth and in a 
community of considerate cultures (Layug). In 2003 the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II), ASEAN members commit to attain the ASEAN 
Vision 2020 by developing the target of constructing an ASEAN Community by 
2020 which embraces three foundation referring to political-security community, 
economic community and socio-cultural community, of which are strictly linked 
and strengthened the determination of guaranteeing sustainable harmony, solidity 
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and mutual affluence in ASEAN (Roadmap for ASEAN Community, 2009-2015) 
(Layug).  
Regionalism 
Regionalism highlights an aim or mutual ideas among a collection of states, which 
have a shared awareness of identity and obligation in constructing international 
organization conveying a specific identity and form joint commitment within a 
geographical region (Kang). According to Nye in his foundational work 
“International Regionalism: Reading” published in 1968, Nye defined a region as 
a group of states linked together by two important characteristics: geographical 
proximity and a certain degree of mutual interdependence amongst these states 
(Nye 1968). According to Fawcett, a region is usually a group of states that share a 
common space on Earth (Fawcett). Other scholars such as Kalevi J. Holsti also have 
similar definition of a region. Simply put, it is clear amongst the academia that a 
region is a to be defined as a cluster of states within a particular geography with a 
common set of ideologies, behaviors, traditional customs and most importantly: 
interdependence amongst those states to a certain degree. Regionalism implies a 
state-of-affair whereby sovereign states acts as main actors and non-state actors 
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cooperate within a common set of parameters and geographical constraints. 
Regionalism refers to a political structure that reflect and shape governments’ 
strategies as well as their policies, business corporations and other social 
movements or units, adopting a top down approach vis-à-vis other social units in 
certain geography.   
 
Achievements of ASEAN in Driving Regionalism 
ASEAN’s Central Role in Formation of Regional Institutionalization 
Since late 1970s and early 1980s, both South Korea and Japan has attempted to 
establish its presence in the East Asian region; with Japan’s fast blossoming 
economy post World War II and its tremendous wave of investments into East Asia 
in search of competitive labor production costs, Japan hoped to realize an Asian 
Network in 1988 after its appreciation of the Yen (Stubbs, 2002); similarly, South 
Korea wanted to establish the Asian Common Market in early 1970s.  However, 
these first two attempts to establish regional economic cooperation / integration 
failed to bear fruit due to historical tension amongst the states, antagonism, wars 
and civil conflicts that resulted in political turmoil and instability, mutual disrespect 
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and suspicion among those great powers at the time.   
 
Nonetheless, there are other political tail-winds that propelled ASEAN into the 
forefront to drive East Asia regionalism. Firstly, with China starting to grow, it is in 
China’s foreign policy where she wanted to assure its economic growth, stabilize 
its domestic communist rule and at the same time project its influence abroad into 
the region. Secondly, with Japan in full-blown industrialization, it is in Japan’s best 
business security interest to stabilize its low costs production bases in ASEAN 
countries by enhancing its political ties and relationships with its East Asian 
counterparts. Thirdly, due to the end of the Cold War and irresistible force of 
globalization, ASEAN countries were eager to remain relevant on the global scale 
and thus were incentivized to work closer together towards prosperity (Stubbs, 2002; 
Cheunboran, 2011). Lastly, with its identifiable benefits, ASEAN is viewed as the 
most suitable institution that serves as the linkage between Southeast Asia and its 
northern powerful counterparts, and being economically less threatening that other 
states, ASEAN was the obvious choice. It is for these reasons, ASEAN got into the 
driver’s seat in enhancing political and economic cooperation. 
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And it is not without initial success, ASEAN initiated the East Asian Economic 
Group (EAEG) in 1990 (later renamed to East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) to 
avoid being viewed as only a trading bloc). The creation of East Asia Summit in 
2005 with the participation of other non-regional players such as Australia, India, 
New Zealand and latter the United States and Russia; below we shall explore more 
in depth of these architectures. 
 
East Asian Economic Group and East Asian Economic Caucus 
The EAEG was initiated by then Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 
during a meeting with China’s Prime Minister Li Peng who was visiting the country. 
Initial purposes were to react to the growing international developments of 
regionalisms, particularly the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), hopeful to provide Asia with an answer and strong voice in participation 
of leading global affairs. P.M. Mohamad proposed the EAEG to improve the 
economic influence and bargaining power of East Asian and thus deliberately 
excluded Western traditional superpowers, in response United States put pressure 
on its allies, namely Japan and South Korea to reject the proposal, it was almost 
inevitable that the EAEG immediately renamed to EAEC to make it sound less like 
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an economic trading bloc that would face fierce competition from the U.S. 
 
However, damage was already done when EAEG was forced to rename itself, 
together with the suspicion of other ASEAN member such as Indonesia, fearing that 
Malaysia has brokered a special deal with China (Stubbs, 2002). But it was because 
the lack of interests by Japan and strong opposition by the United States, the EAEG 
was off to a stumbling start, despite its existence, the caucus never really took off 
its intended goals and was inevitably put on hold given the reasons above, as well 
as the ill-timing as APEC at the same time is rapidly developing.   Although 
ASEAN, or in this case a key member of ASEAN was central in developing 
regional economic cooperation, the EAEG or EAEC never materialized in its 
perceived manner and thus had limited or none success in driving regionalism. 
 
Although Sinapore’s Lee Kuan Yew tried to resurrect the idea by saying “…an idea 
[the cacus] would not go away” (Stubbs, 2002), the EAEC only contributed to the 
successful launch of the eventual ASEAN +3 in 1997 in tandem of the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  
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East Asian Summit 
Learning from its missteps in the EAEC, the East Asian Summit first meeting in 
Malaysia in 2005 was more welcomed by both member and non-member states, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of India, New Zealand and Australia in its summit, as 
these non-member states viewed the Summit as a hub to counter the now fast 
growing and economically influential China. Not only the Summit meetings is tied 
in to the timetable of ASEAN annual ministerial meetings hosted by ASEAN 
countries, ASEAN also has great influence in determining the membership of the 
Summit by controlling the status of “ASEAN Dialogue Partner”, key to 
participating of the East Asian Summit. By 2011, United States and Russia was also 
welcomed into the EAS.   
 
As seen in the above analysis, albeit with mixed successes, ASEAN did enjoy a 
central role in formulation of the region’s main cooperation infrastructure, most 
successfully the East Asian Summit; however, the summit involvement of non-
member states is both a blessing and a curse where the Western superpowers still 
flexes in muscles to ensure its interests are unharmed – a key obstacle for ASEAN 
to truly evolve into a regional hegemon.   
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Collectively, the members of ASEAN have been responsible for launching a 
number of key regional institutions. The institutions bring together within a 
multilateral security forum all the states, including the major super-powers, with 
security interest in the East Asia region. Similarly, ASEAN took responsibility for 
organizing the creation of the ASEAN +3. This emerging organization, brings 
together the members of the ASEAN within the three Northeast superpowers, China, 
Japan and South Korea. The aim is to ensure regional cooperation in various areas, 
notably in security, culture and economic development strategy.   
 
ASEAN’s Role in Driving Political Regionalism 
ASEAN’s influence in shaping or participating in the regional political arena was 
quite incidental, in the backdrop was the vulnerability of the South China Sea, 
Korean peninsula crisis and repeated failures of the Six Party Talks, and especially 
the heightened efforts that United States have put into counterbalancing China’s rise 
have highlighted East Asia’s fragility in maintaining peace and security.  Thus 
incidentally ASEAN has been propelled into the forefront of regional security 
agenda for a number of reasons: 
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1) Asia is divided into strong individual north countries and a cluster of smaller 
South and East Asian countries, and given the historical hostility and 
political mistrust amongst the North great powers (e.g. China vs Japan, 
South Korea vs China), ASEAN has been given weight in linking these 
major powers and driving regional cooperation. In Alice D. Ba’s article, she 
argued that great power relations are characterized by “a mixture of 
uncertainty, mutual suspicion, long-range jostling for position, a desire for 
cooperation to advance vital political and security and economic interests, 
a widely-shared desire to somehow manage the rise of China, and China’s 
wish to dispove the China threat theory” (Ba, 2009).  Hence in the 
backdrop of mutual distrust but the deep desire by Asian superpowers 
(except China) to enhance regional security or political cooperation with 
one another, ASEAN is the obvious fall back to broker all necessary 
cooperation among the Asian powers to counter the China threat to the 
region.   
2) The ASEAN has demonstrated its credibility in maintaining peace and 
security – as evidenced by the East Asian Summit which brought together 
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otherwise countries that are hostile or characterized by tension, namely 
China, United States and Russia. As an institution that has almost 50 years 
of existence, the ASEAN has matured and served as a regional power broker 
and sometimes the all-important mediator. 
3) No single country (possibly the exception of North Korea) would want to 
reengage in large scale military conflict after the cold war and World War II 
and thus this desire acted as a catalyst to have mutual cooperation and 
ameliorate their security and economic benefits, and this cooperation can be 
readily promoted by ASEAN. In particular, ASEAN is relatively small, both 
in terms of real and relative power and thus can be less threatening and has 
an appearance of being more objective in promoting such regional security 
objectives.   
 
It is for the above reasons that ASEAN has set its foot onto the regional political-
security arena in driving greater interdependence, that is has led numerous meetings 
for actors to exchange concerns and to deal with specific security problems. As a 
clear indication of success, the 2002 Cambodia ASEAN summit gave rise to a 
solution to South China Sea’s conflict with a “Declaration of Conduct of Parties in 
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the South China Sea”, a definite win for ASEAN in flexing its muscles as a power 
broker to make China accord itself to the norms as viewed by other countries in the 
region.   
 
Another demonstration of success in ASEAN’s agenda setting capability is the 
conclusion of the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II” that facilitated the creation 
of various ASEAN Community consisting of the three pillars, that remained 
significant to address shared norms and rules of good conducts in inter-state 
relations (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2009). 
ASEAN is also central in balancing Northeast Asian superpowers like China and 
Japan against non-regional countries like Russia and the United States as its 
traditional non-interventional “ASEAN Way” strategy. According to Goh (Goh 
2003), the ASEAN Way is characterized by four basic principles: 
a) Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
b) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one-another; 
c) Settlement of disputes by peaceful means; and  
d) Renunciation of the threat or use of force 
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As a result, ASEAN was able to maintain its existence and also to balance the great 
powers to achieve regional peace and security. The power to include non-member 
states to the East Asian Summit is an effective tool to maintain check on China’s 
rise, in which its traditional inclusion principle and consensus based mechanism 
further acts as a natural balance of power with ASEAN member states. 
 
ASEAN’s Role in East Asia Economic Regionalism  
ASEAN’s influence on the wider world stage comes to the global forefront in the 
establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  Formed 
in 1989 in Australia at a ministerial meeting, APEC brought together economies 
from round the Pacific Rim, including the United States, Japan, Australia and 
Canada. As a measure to prevent APEC from outshining the ASEAN, it was agreed 
that an ASEAN member would host APEC every other year. With APEC’s agenda 
mostly driven by the host country’s pressing economic issues, this arrangement has 
given ASEAN members considerable leverage over the development of APEC and 
ensured that members states’ interests are not overridden by larger economies with 
the APEC. 
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Over the years, ASEAN’s increasing credibility and economic prosperity in the 
decades leading up to the late 1990s, has swept through the region against a wave 
of foreign direct investments that flowed into the region from Japan, consequently 
certain members of the European Union also seek to form a formal linkage. The 
fact that ASEAN had developed a central institutional role in East Asia was the key 
to the EU’s interest in developing ties to the Association. The idea of Asia-Europe 
Meeting was approved by ASEAN in 1995.   
 
At the same time as the ASEAN +3 was starting to emerge as a framework for 
regional cooperation, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 swept through the region. 
Resentment at the way IMF had mishandled the problem and imposed inappropriate 
measures on Thailand and Indonesia only exacerbated the situation spurred regional 
leaders to find a regional solution to combat the collective vulnerabilities to the 
forces of globalization (Higgot 1998; Bowles 2002). The 1997 crisis clearly 
sharpened the interrogation of the interests of economic globalization and 
especially the utility of the United STates, which in turn began changing the basis 
for regional organization in general and articulation of regional cooperation in 
response to the global financial disorder. Consequently, the establishment of 
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ASEAN+3 with ten areas of cooperation at their apex is financial cooperation 
initiated to grapple with the 1997/8 crisis and to benefit from the support of Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers had discussed 
comprehensive financial cooperation since 1998 and at last successfully created 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000 in order to address the short-term liquidity 
problems which could devastate the whole economy as already learned from the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, In 2009, ASEAN+3 agreed to move from bilateral 
swap agreements to the multilateralization or from the initially agreed amount of 
$80 billion to $120 billion after the adverse experience of the 2008 global economic 
crisis.  
 
Besides, ASEAN+3 countries are holding the ambitious “regional 
institutionalization project” of economic integration called East Asian Free Trade 
Area (EAFTA); however, there have so far been only the bilateral free trade areas 
(FTAs) between ASEAN and each Northeast Asian country (Jakarta Post, 2009). 
Moreover, ASEAN has also been very active and proactive in initiating hard 
development infrastructures, but the funds on the enormous infrastructure buildings 
have heavily and mainly been contributed by the Plus Three countries. 
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Chiang Mai Initiative / Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization  
The 1997 financial crisis exposed the financial vulnerability of these smaller Asian 
counties, particularly the way they felt being treated by the international community, 
in drying up the much needed liquidity to keep their currency from collapsing. It 
was a traumatic experience for the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Thailand and 
South Korea had to resort to massive bailouts by the IMF, and because of the harsh 
conditions being imposed, the bailout provoked resentment, particularly in light of 
IMF’s misdiagnosis of the nature of the crisis (which the IMF subsequently 
acknowledged). In return ASEAN members reached out for financial cooperation 
with China and Japan which resulted in a much better situation through their aids 
and assistance. It is against this backdrop that the countries finally came to realize 
the importance to establish regional financial safety nets like the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) in 2000.   
 
The development of the CMI has been a long and difficult path. The first step 
towards the development of a regional safety net took place back in 1977 where 
central banks and monetary authorities of the original ASEAN countries agreed to 
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establish a bilateral currency or swap arrangements to enhance inter-state liquidity. 
The amount was initially set at US$100m, which was subsequently increased to 
US$200m in 1998. However, the amount turned out to be totally inadequate to 
withstand the Asian Financial Crisis. The CMI was created in 2000 by expanding 
the bilateral swaps to include all ASEAN +3 member states. The CMI was intended 
to be supplemental to the existing financial facilities of the IMF, but with the 2008 
global financial crisis experience where Korea and Singapore borrowed from the 
US Federal Reserve which Indonesia secured financing from the World Bank, the 
existing CMI framework needs to be enhanced, ASEAN +3 countries being 
questioning the existing international financial turmoil as agreeing to the 
“Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy” and 
therefore decided to strengthen and restructure the existing regional bilateral 
financial cooperation by transforming the CMI into a multilateral swap agreement 
to further guarantee the regional financial stability, mitigate risk-averse sentiments 
and boost regional market investor confidence. And by 2009 in Phuket, that on this 
special occasion in response to the global economic turmoil, the ASEAN +3 
Finance Ministers agreed to transform the bilateral agreements into multilateral 
agreements, becoming the CMIM, a self- managed reserving pooling arrangement 
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governed by a single contract. The CMIM came into effect with US$120billion by 
2009. In 2012 the amount was doubled to US$240billion.    
 
To assess the effectiveness of the CMIM, it is necessary to understand the 
mechanism of how it works: in the event of a balance of payments or liquidity crisis 
akin to the 1997 and 2008 financial crisis, a member government can swap its local 
currency for US dollars from this pool. Each individual country’s borrowing limit 
is based on its contribution multiplied by its respective borrowing multiplier. For 
illustration purposes, the multiplier is 5 for Cambodia, 2.5 for Hong Kong and 0.5 
for China. The conditions for securing a swap are a completed review of the 
economic and financial situation, compliance with covenants, while these decisions 
are not complex, they are nonetheless time-consuming. 
 
There are a few critical reasons why ASEAN has been able to retain the default 
centrality role in driving regional financial cooperation; coordinately contents of 
CMI meetings, and implementing remedial actions required by the CMI.   
Firstly, greatly because of the appreciation of roles of China and Japan in the post-
crisis recovery period and the gradual realization of regional economic 
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interdependence and interconnection, the regional cooperation that the CMI 
attempted to create not merely only by China and Japan, but also the crisis victim 
countries. Owning to legacies of colonialism endowed with mistrust, neither Japan 
/ South Korea nor China was allowed practically to lead such financial regional 
cooperation at that time. Therefore, only ASEAN was given this central position in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.   
 
Secondly, after the initial 1997 crisis, both Japan and China had exponential level 
of foreign exchange reserve, and wished to establish regional financial cooperation. 
Without the central coordination of ASEAN, these two economic superpowers will 
find it difficult to financially cooperate with each other to prevent any future crisis. 
For instance, Japan also held in excess of US$300billion in its foreign exchange 
reserve, ranked only behind the entire EU Monetary Union. In total, ASEAN +3 
countries had US$729billion foreign reserve positions. As a result, with just a 
moderate portion of the foreign exchange reserve holding in the region to maintain 
stability, ASEAN +3 countries would mobilize more resources than would be 
available to many of them from global financial institutions and Group of Seven 
countries, but this financial cooperation could only be achieved with ASEAN in the 
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middle, maintaining its default centrality. 
 
Thirdly, Japan has from its outset proposed to create the Asian version of the IMF, 
dubbed the AMF, which was strongly opposed by US, G7 and the IMF itself as it 
would greatly undermine IMF’s existing functions and divided the Asian major 
powers from the West controlled global economic institutions. It was also suspected 
by China towards Japan’s intention of transforming itself into a regional hegemony. 
As a result, Japan became less active to bring the AMF to life as the United States 
continued to exert tremendous amount of pressure. Only the ASEAN led CMI 
mechanisms regarded as regional financial cooperation could later obtain the 
support of the United States and the IMF as its nature of regional cooperation to 
provide quick regional resources is in addition to that provided by the IMF, while 
ASEAN +3 and the IMF can jointly manage future crisis, and it also serves right 
into the interests of IMF’s regional surveillance activities (Rana, 2002).   
 
Despite the multi-fold changes in the fine-tuning of the CMIM over the years to 
bring about cooperation in four main areas, namely (1) monitoring capital flows, (2) 
regional surveillance, (3) swap networks and (4) training personnel; it is still 
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debatable and questionable whether it is or can become an effective regional safety 
net in the event of another financial crisis, even as a supplement to the IMF. It is 
worth noted that the reserve pool was never called upon since its inception. Several 
factors may illustrate the potential vulnerability or inadequacy of the reserve pool; 
although the size of the swap pool has increased substantially to US$240 billion, 
the sums involved are still very low. The amount available to large countries are 
very much lower that what Indonesia and Thailand required from the IMF in 1998. 
By way of comparison, the equivalent European fund had circa 750 billion euros in 
2010, representing 8% of Europe’s GDP, while CMIM amounted to only 1.5% of 
the members’ aggregate GDP. Overall, the CMI has a long way to go before it could 
be of similar level of importance or credible partner to the IMF, the IMF has deeper 
pockets, more sophisticated systems and methods for dealing with financial crisis, 
despite past errors. 
 
East Asian Free Trade Area 
In addition to the CMI successful creation and implementation, ASEAN +3 
countries did not pause in its attempt to further move forward to realize the goal of 
true regional economic and trade cooperation mainly due to the rapid rate of 
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globalization as a catalyst to economic growth, and the opportunity for deepening 
the economic ties rather than high and uncertain outside economic competitions 
(Ravenhill, 2008). Since its inception in 1997, ASEAN +3 has not yet been 
successful in creating the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), and contrary to 
other institutions that we have discussed, that albeit most of the meetings of EAFTA 
were convened in ASEAN countries, ASEAN seem to have less centrality in 
institutionalizing the EAFTA due to the following reasons: 
 
Firstly, its is due to the growing economic disagreement between China and Japan 
on Intellectual Property Rights: (1) branding (2) manufacturing process and 
techniques and (3) lack of transparent and useful legal framework in China. On one 
hand, Japan wants China to comply strictly with the intellectual property rights 
based on the rules of law prior to the establishment of a free trade area. On the other 
hand, China feels reluctant to observer international intellectual property rights law 
as its economic setbacks will be significant, by lowering Chinese investments. Over 
this hot issue, ASEAN countries, with its relative lack of economic bargaining 
power, chose to remain silent, as these smaller ASEAN countries are usually the 
recipient of generous Chinese economic aid and the single largest foreign investor. 
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Secondly, the wide gap between the quality of goods produced ASEAN and the 
China, Japan and South Korea production further widens the economic gaps 
between the countries. These crucial factors are critical in the discussion and debate 
in forming a free trade area, and given the disparity, it undermines ASEAN’s 
centrality in EAFTA.   
 
Thirdly and more importantly, ASEAN has concerns on its own Asia Free Trade 
Area, so its seems to play less core roles in the contemplated formulation of the 
EAFTA. In the joint statements issued in 2011, the Ministers reiterated the 
importance and vitality of ASEAN centrality in the expanded regional economic 
integration process. Although goes without saying that ASEAN so far acted 
proactively to improve economic cooperation, but mostly limited in a bilateral form, 
unlike the CMI mentioned above where ASEAN is the core of the multilateral swap 
agreements. Since 1992, the ASEAN has a 2020 goal of establishing the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), additionally, although progress is steady as of 2016, 
the AEC is still largely a work in progress. Similarly, to reinforce the early comment 
on the bilateral format of collaboration, ASEAN and China has bilaterally created 
the ASEAN – China Free Trade Area which entered into force on January 2010.  
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With Japan, ASEAN adopted a “Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement” 
with Japan since 2008, a similar agreement with Korea in 2007, another bilateral 
agreement with Australasia in 2010, etc. Furthermore, individual ASEAN members 
have accepted to a wider free trade agreement namely the US drive “Trans-Pacific 
Partnership” in which Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are members 
preferring to support the TPP. Based on the above reasons, ASEAN has so far been 
playing limited roles in leading the EAFTA realization albert its hosting and 
facilitating of the relevant meetings.  ASEAN has not been able to exert as much 
influence and centrality in the East Asian Free Trade Area. 
 
Setbacks of ASEAN 
The obstacles towards the success of ASEAN economic regionalism are largely 
resulted from the lack of mass support, the refusal of states to give in for national 
interests, socioeconomic heterogeneity and the variance in identity.  
 
Lack of Domestic Support 
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The weak in building a shared identity because state-directed economic cooperation 
include tiny or no consultation with significant stakeholders, resulting in the 
absence of the participation of the masses in in the accomplishment of ASEAN 
decisions as suggested by various regional studies scholars, such as Acharya 
(Acharya), Sung (S. W. Kim), because the development seems to be both elitist and 
state-centric with tiny emphasis to consult the opinions of the common people. That 
means, the notion of “ASEAN Community” lacks one of the vital elements of 
fundamental achievement in the community building: the dearth of the participation 
of the masses, because the ASEAN condition is relatively complicated due to the 
heterogeneity in the historical context, political systems, levels of development, 
beliefs, norms, identities and values, such as human rights, a social contract, liberal 
democracy and the rule of law as desired principles of governance, in Southeast 
Asia, which thwart the formation of ASEAN regionalism (Benny). The mass is 
considered as one of the main actors in the regionalization and their opinion is 
regarded as a vital component of regionalization by the main philosophies of 
regional integration, such as transactionalism, neofunctionalism and democracy, 
because the support of the general public influences the achievement of regional 
integration, public feedback and criticism provided crucial response for outlining 
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policy (Collins) (Deutsch) (Hewstone). Though ASEAN has succeeded in seizing 
academic attention on the commitment of elites and states in institutional 
developments, the findings of civic opinion in ASEAN regionalism is limited 
because political-economic interactions, the expansion of ASEAN as a regional 
organization, and socioeconomic obstacles challenge ASEAN over the years 
(Denise Hew) (Guerrero), leading to a smaller degree of legitimacy for 
regionalization, the rigidity of simply pomposity in the higher tiers of society for 
the entire development and the potential danger of fading out in the initiative 
(Benny).  
 
As pointed out by Vo Tri Thanh, awareness of institution building in Vietnam is 
inadequate and an overall absence of willingness or planning for the state’s active 
involvement in ASEAN is obvious, although Vietnam has revised main laws and 
formalized the demand for consultation by modifying these laws in 2008, implying 
that rising stakeholder consultation is crucial to Vietnam (Das). Nevertheless, the 
consultation process tends to be ineffective since non-governmental organizations 
and civil society are rarely involved in public consultation because consultation is 
limited chiefly to customary stakeholders like government agencies, research and 
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business groups; also, the outcome of the consultative procedure is not open, 
creating a barrier for the mass to voice out or to plan sufficiently for the application 
of Vietnam’s obligations (Das).  
 
Moreover, regionalization directed solely by states will result in policy divergences 
since internal policies in the state will clash with these liberalization measures, for 
instance, case study on the Philippines’ automotive segment conducted by Austria 
visibly demonstrates that the importance of regionalization measures to align with 
supportive internal policies, like enhancement in governmental competences, 
because low governmental expenditures and low transaction costs will attract the 
foreign direct investment which is indispensable for the state’s industrial expansion 
(Das). However, source of policy divergence is obvious between trade policy as 
advocated by ASEAN and domestic investment policy: since the decrease of duties 
under ASEAN Free Trade Area attracts more importation of motor vehicles and 
parts and components, which fails to induce the desired investment for the 
automotive segment due to high manufacture expenditures and the lack of a solid 
supplier source, trade policies forbid the import of second-hand automobiles and 
components and parts are affected (Das). 
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Besides, research on Malaysia shows that policy divergences within the state, for 
instance, the services sector has become the main focus of the latest font of 
development since the Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3: 2006-20) and the 
services sector shares most supported sectors in the Tenth Malaysia Plan and the 
Economic Transformation Plan, so the services sector is comparatively more 
sheltered by equity restrictions and internal rules (Das). On one hand, the 
government is unilaterally liberalizing by initiating numerous unilateral plans in 
order to fulfill the need to open the services sector for regionalism; on the other 
hand, Malaysia is alert about engaging in unalterable obligations under its free trade 
arrangements, such as the state’s pledges under the AEC, causing a discrepancy 
between obligations at the regional level and practices at domestic level, together 
with the liberalization of services sector is constrained by the widespread existence 
of government-connected businesses since these companies will be “protected” 
from liberalization by local policies, which act as governmental impediments to 
external investment; thus, by taking a conservative attitude will influence the state’s 
pledges as all sectors in Malaysia’s services under liberalization, which will further 
underpin the position of internal rules in services sector, just like the situation of 
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the Philippines, liberalization obligations in the ASEAN will be spoiled by internal 
guidelines which persist to safeguard internal decisions and enterprises from the 
external force of liberalization (Das). 
 
Socioeconomic Heterogeneity and Wide Gap between Member States 
The relative disparity of Southeast Asia states, like the rule of law among member 
states is weak with variance in application and societal beliefs making the rule of 
law idea challenging, such as the construction of a single market is limited, though 
recognized by each member state as a shared goal (Orcalli). Since the economies of 
most ASEAN members are weak, such as the less developed Indochinese and the 
Philippines, ASEAN is separated into two levels of economic groups, leading to the 
difficulty in balancing this economic inequality between the richer founding 
members and less developed economies of ASEAN members’ states (S. P. Kim). 
ASEAN states not only encounter challenges in huge degree of economic growth, 
for instance, the disparity between Singapore, and Myanmar and Laos, but also have 
failed to arrange an improvement in either a harmonized domestic tariff system or 
a mutual external tariff scheme (Richard Baldwin).  
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Also, the rule of law in Southeast Asia is weak because the heterogeneity in beliefs, 
collective norms, social identities and social values hinder the implementation of 
the idea of the rule of law, leading to the failure in the construction of a single 
market, even though it is committed by all member states as a shared goal which 
benefits all members (Orcalli).  
 
Moreover, regarding intellectual property protection, some of the members in 
RCEP have noteworthy distinctions in highlighting, some member states, like 
Singapore and Japan, focus on enlarging the property security measures, while 
some states like Indonesia and India, emphasize on intellectual property access, 
such as issues related to manufacture of ‘generic’ pharmaceutical stuffs (Rimmer).  
 
Though progress in the reduction and removal of tariffs in the region can be found, 
tiny advancement in formulation and abolition of non-tariff policy, which upset 
both importations and exports, for instance, export licences are required by majority 
ASEAN member states excluding the Philippines or export levies are inflicted for 
particular commodities except for Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines, counting 
commodities within intra-region exchange, worsening intra-ASEAN trade (Das). 
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In addition, regarding the ASEAN Single Window, ASEAN states are confronted 
by a dearth of coordination between states and an absence of suitable human 
capitals since ASEAN experiences a huge disparity between states’ logistics 
development: according to the World Bank Logistics Performance Index in 2016, 
which evaluates timeliness in consignments, customs (border control competence), 
infrastructure quality, capability of logistics facilities, capability to locate and trace 
deliveries and easiness of organizing reasonable priced freights, Singapore secures 
5th position, while Myanmar ranks the 113th out of 160 countries (The World Bank). 
Hence, due to substantial difference in culture, beliefs, collective norms, and social 
identities of the region’s states, ASEAN member states face noteworthy difficulties 
in assenting on collective objectives and rules, and are reluctant to collaborate on 
matters disturbing national sovereignty and interests, resulting in persistent quarrels 
concerning leadership and territorial disputes among member states, the absence of 
a political determination to launch compensation policies and the little disposition 
to foster an ASEAN economic constitution in the future, implying collective 
objectives and rules are not at the center of such collaboration (Orcalli). 
 
Saliency of National Interest and Divergence of Interests  
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Saliency and deviation of interests among member states fails to facilitate the 
formation of a competent economic constitution, causing the shortage of profound 
and rooted institutionalized integration in ASEAN, especially the dearth of wide-
ranging appropriate abolition of non-tariff trade obstacles (Orcalli). The insufficient 
assistance for a successful economic constitution within ASEAN, because ASEAN 
is deprived from any opportunity of political governing of reparation matters for 
conditions of clash of interests, leads to the dearth of conversation of compensatory 
system, so compensatory systems are futile within the economic constitution of 
ASEAN, partly resulted from the demand for reparation usually occurs once a 
domestic market is almost to be, or has been, founded (Orcalli). Due to the 
nonexistence of the concept of equality regarding interconnection rules and the idea 
of relocation of supplies among ASEAN members, this fundamental element in 
community building illustrates the challenge of ASEAN in regional development 
as resolution to diverging interests within ASEAN is missing, that means, no 
obligation or punishment is incurred for ASEAN members to compete with each 
other by liberalizing their own market, implying that the direct challenges 
encountered by ASEAN will be the allocation expenses fail to be resolved and 
tackled with by intergovernmentalism solely, instead, the establishment of a 
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constitutionally grounded regional unit to regulate of distinct economies and to 
allocate the benefits of the domestic economy is required (Orcalli). Due to a strong 
variance of national interests and competences among ASEAN states, the 
prerequisite to illustrate clear interests for every member state offers a precise 
difficulty, for example, the policy goals of a collective plan advocated by the 
leading members will be harmful to the interests of the weaker and inferior 
neighbors (Orcalli). 
 
Firstly, overemphasis on own interests will lead to the reluctance of states in 
establishing an agreed supranational rule or efficient and similar transnational rule, 
as the vast economic discrepancies amongst the members, such as the development 
in Laos, Cambodia and Singapore (Orcalli), for instance, member states are 
opposed to legalized and formal rule, and are conventionally unwilling to establish 
official obliging obligations on governing matters, leading to a conflict between the 
dearth of competence to accomplish a constitution built on Common law and the 
demand not to follow a contractual constitution (Statute Law) (Hamilton-Hart). 
Although interference rules are targeted overtly at settling diverse domestic and 
social interests in regional and exchange policies, a strong obligation to equality 
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and to the idea of a collective agreement are still absent in the contemporary 
ASEAN because ASEAN fails to establish redistributive policies, the idea of Own 
Resources, dialogue of a collective agreement within ASEAN and interference rules 
in which counterbalance the effect of regional market rule (Orcalli). Hence, defense 
of national autonomy and the consensus principle remain to serve as an obstacle 
towards the ASEAN community construction, leading to the failure of ASEAN to 
place a constraint to the discretionary authority of ASEAN members to the 
utilization of domestic policies to avoid the organization from restraining states’ 
own autonomy (Pempel). 
 
Also, lacking the political determination among member states to establish an 
economic constitution built on common aims to create an internal market and 
interference measures, which will act as the effective ways for implementing an 
economic constitution guaranteeing economic openness via the free trade of 
commodities and services, the right of formation of business and the mobility of 
human and capital, implies that the basic rights will be absent to each member states 
since domestic policies will supersede ASEAN commitment and no system can be 
implemented above ASEAN states (Pempel). 
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Secondly, variance in interests precludes states from establishing a strong 
leadership, which may originate from leaders, states or clusters of states, to secure 
the obligation to regionalism and political determination to tackle the demand for 
compensation and compromise, which up till now is still not treated as an essential 
component of an ASEAN unanimity, since the foundation for an economic 
constitution are ambiguous, albeit certain agreement is initiated, like the ASEAN 
Charter (Articles 24–26) lays out a dispute settlement (Orcalli), instigating the 
member states regard each other as independent and rival resulted from the structure 
of economies and trade orientation of ASEAN, which in turn affects potential 
benefits from the collaboration in a single-market framework: since many member 
states are comparatively small or middle scale economies, their external trade focus 
on wealthier non-member trading partners, like the U.S. and the EU, which 
influence the scope of economic integration among the Southeast Asia states 
(Angresano). Hence, saliency of national interests induces negative implication for 
Southeast states, for instance, although the 1997–1998 economic disaster facilitated 
a substantial growth of the awareness of closer regionalism, official collaboration 
is lesser than anticipated because government capability failed to support policy 
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formulation and implementation, resulted in the disparity in crises reaction, 
particularly after a significant disaster (Hamilton-Hart).  
 
Besides, in spite of the consensus of member states to implement a single market 
and an united manufacture foundation within AEC, deferments in establishing an 
internal market for member states place severe barriers to cross-border commercial 
activities, such as technical and other obstacles remain though mandated by the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement, levies practices in ASEAN deter firms from 
engaging in intra-ASEAN trade and investment, the slow progress of regularization 
of merchandises transacted within ASEAN and the intricacy of executing the 
ASEAN rules of origin which defines the eligibility benchmarks to the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (Andreosso-O’Callaghan), contributing to the 
eminence of state-oriented instead of region-oriented aims (Dent), together with 
ASEAN, being an executive association, is generally not centralized to secure the 
demand of its member states for their own political independence, resulting in the 
tiny awareness of member states in any community building which will offer 
potential Asian superpowers to intervene in their internal matters (Angresano). 
Thus, with limited progress of a concept of a collective agreement, ASEAN policies 
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for a market society are inadequate to construct a unique hub of commodities, 
services, labor and investment (Orcalli). Although integration can contribute to the 
production of a rule-based regional institute, which facilitates the participating 
states to fortify and intensify their pledge and involvement to the development of 
regionalism, for example, by forming a legitimately mandatory conflict mechanism 
for settlement of trade clashes among the member states in ASEAN together with 
the formation of an ASEAN Charter, over-concentration on internal interest will 
heighten the obstacle to ASEAN economic regionalism once more states are 
involved in the process of policymaking because members keen to secure national 
interest and are reluctant to give in, for example, states like Myanmar utilize the 
doctrines of non-interference as a pretext to defend against any political 
transformation, which are essential in integrating each state in a cohesive portion 
of a greater unity for realizing a regional economic community, that means, barriers 
for the mutual effort of building a bigger ASEAN economic community remained 
as ASEAN member states are unwilling to forgo a slight portion of their internal 
autonomy for overall interests (S. P. Kim). The commitment of actors in the 
ASEAN constructions stays at the state level, which involves no transmission or 
integration of capabilities, because autonomy remains the main concern among 
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ASEAN members, hindered ASEAN from neither participating in outlining policies 
for an institutional framework nor founding basic common economic liberties and 
shared rivalry guidelines, so numerous researchers believe that certain practice of 
enforceability is mandatory, such as establishment of a notion of conformity with a 
reliable system to resolve conflicts and tackle problems of non-conformity, in case 
ASEAN desires to fortify its obligation to intensify its economic regionalism 
(Caballero-Anthony). Although the notion and discussion of ASEAN reveal an 
aspiration for a free trade zone, limited concrete measures are developed to expand 
this desire into a latest form of economic regionalism except its member states to 
strengthen their commitment to a promised economic constitution, implying that 
issues of identity, leadership, substantial disparity and an unsound economic 
constitution inhibit ASEAN from realizing an internal market, while procedure of 
market guideline is not binding and obligation to mandatory policies is tiny, making 
ASEAN to persist a lax regional organization and impending the full execution of 
the ASEAN Charter over time (Orcalli). The political determination and perception 
of the leaders of member states and support from Southeast Asia all together affect 
the progression of crafting an ASEAN Economic Community on taking the gentle 
or quick path, while the challenging political issue is on in what way the states are 
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willing to cooperate and balance state main concerns into a mutual regional strategy 
of economic regionalism, for instance, the political concern for ASEAN Ten Plus 
Three is in what way the regulatory system can be consistent, so the establishment 
of a collective regional custom standard is a difficulty for ASEAN Ten Plus Three 
(Okfen). All these issues imply that the achievement of the objective of an ASEAN 
Economic Community needs to overcome numerous hurdles and it requires 
persistent effort. 
 
Thirdly, the disputes among member states ate caused by contesting desire for 
resource, for example, due to the lack of resources, Vietnam is unwilling and 
incapable to utilize resources to apply certain policies of the AEC, like shared 
acknowledgement and services liberalization, while the majority of state supplies 
are expended for the outlining of key rules or policies which are contemplated to 
be cross-cutting matters associated with the state’s trade liberalization policies, so 
tiny participant discussion on the lessening of the policy space regarding Vietnam’s 
obligations in the AEC is resulted (Das). Even though ASEAN-regional business 
improves, the volume is insignificant since substantial hitches in attaining the 
unrestricted mobility of experienced labor and a distinct market for commodities, 
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services and investment, for instance, duties and other constraints on commodities 
exchange, resulted in limited growth on services, investment, non-tariff obstacles, 
collective recognition and harmonization of benchmarks (Orcalli).  
 
Also, in the circumstance of Vietnam, conflicts are related to the deficiency of 
competence of stakeholders to comprehend the details of regionalism and 
collaboration methods, like the agricultural or employed poor which suffer loss 
from the regionalism activity; in Thailand, small peasants in the Thai rural area are 
perceived to miss out because the scarcity of the resources limit their 
competitiveness against large companies and multinational corporation in this 
segment, so the interests of small local businesses in Vietnam and Thailand will be 
sacrificed in the process of the ASEAN regionalism (Das).  
 
In Thailand’s situation, the logistics sector classifies the scope as an significant 
element in the competence of a business to react to the viable contests of ASEAN-
led regionalism policies, for instance, small domestic logistics companies in 
Thailand are supposed to marginalize because they have limited access to monetary 
funding and they fail to contest against the bigger companies and corporations in 
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this industry in areas like the advancement in know-how, managing structures and 
advertising, so the key successes of ASEAN tend to be the large traders, large 
commodity-processing firms and high-yield peasants in the farming business, while 
the potential victors of logistics liberalization in Thailand will be the big logistics 
firms, corporations in the logistics industry and other companies which are clients 
of these services (Das). Besides, although the case analysis of Thailand on the 
mobility of natural persons from the medical business states that infirmaries which 
are involved in medical tourism will receive greatest interest because of a scarcity 
of health expertise in the state, while another concern will be the capability of Thai 
health personnel fail to contest against influxes of health workforces from other 
ASEAN states who tend to possess a better benefit in areas like communication 
skills to global sufferers and sufferers at neighboring infirmaries (Das).  
 
Apart from Vietnam and Thailand, ASEAN is encountering with China on in what 
way to contend successfully against expanding economic influence of China: the 
ASEAN participants are unable to contest with China efficiently as singular 
economic entities since the mainstream of the participants fail to race China to 
tempt Foreign Direct Investments and know-how from the Western international 
44 
 
corporations (S. P. Kim). Although East and Southeast Asia shared 31% Foreign 
Direct Investment inflow in the world in 2014, reaching $381 billion, Foreign 
Direct Investment inflows to China reached $129 billion, while Singapore, being 
the main beneficiary of Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asia, reached $67.5 
billion, other ASEAN member states, like Indonesia merely received $22.6 billion. 
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Source: World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance 
Since the market in East Asia is significantly bigger than in intra-ASEAN and is 
prone to draw more Foreign Direct Investments to the region, it is necessary for 
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ASEAN’s cooperation with China to implement a mutual policy to induce 
additional Foreign Direct Investments to ASEAN in the background of a global 
division of labor, so ASEAN and China can balance their distinct roles to 
collaborate instead of to contest with each other, implying that the importance of 
new feasible approach by accelerating the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Area arrangement so as to induce more Foreign Direct Investments to the 
ASEAN members and to increase share of Foreign Direct Investments to ASEAN 
which is lost land to China (S. P. Kim). 
 
Difference in Identity 
ASEAN states do not recognize each other, posing adverse effects on ASEAN 
regionalism and regional identity-construction: Indonesia’s standing as first among 
equals, being the biggest state in the region, shown hegemonic inclinations in 
Mearsheimer’s dominance logic since the establishment of ASEAN (Layug); 
Singapore’s self-exceptionalism is related to its extraordinary geographical, 
economical, and cultural features, fight for national identity, superseding economic 
necessities for state existence” (Thomson); Thailand’s identity is centered on the 
past circumstance of being the sole state in Southeast Asia, which freed from 
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Western occupation due chiefly to the skillful governance of their former 
governments and the positive historical conditions like Western Powers’ over-
concentration on other Southeast Asia states; the Philippines’ identity as the sole 
Southeast Asia state, which was comparatively unaffected by Indianization and 
Sinicization during the pre-colonial period, has been identified as the third grouping 
of political and cultural impact (Layug).  
 
ASEAN-directed socialization will provide a place for mounting the importance of 
identity in ASEAN interactions by offering a location for the member states to 
communicate serenely, which allows them to fight for their national interests and 
visualizes their identities, because certain disputes between and among the member 
states resulted from their inaccurate perception about the identity and self-esteems 
which they possess about each member, such as the negative effects of constructing 
biases and prejudices grounded on “perceived” history and culture (Layug).  
 
The factors will induce an undesirable influence on regional integration, for 
instance, the identity crises of both China and Japan hold the similar “selective 
othering” created by historical and cultural factors, causing every state maintaining 
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adverse structuring of the other’s identity (Wirth), so by offering a normative 
structure for peaceful co-survival, ASEAN can continue to socialize the member 
states to assist them in discussing their identities and view the other states positively 
via social learning and unlearning (Layug).  
 
Besides, the utmost barrier for the success of the economic regionalism is the 
difference in identities between China and Japan as China adopts Communist rule, 
while Japan is under capitalist, so by ensuring the joint effort between China and 
Japan in supporting ASEAN decision is crucial since both states are regarded as 
one of the main economy power in East Asia, for instance, Japan can take the lead 
in the economic responsibilities because its “flying geese” ideal has been 
recognized positive in creating about economic advancement for Asian states, such 
as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, but Japan 
is suspicious in the ability to take the positive obligatory political guidance for 
ASEAN regionalism since the ASEAN members, especially China, retain mistrust 
for Japan’s leading position to foster ASEAN regionalism (S. P. Kim).  
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Regarding the economic aspect, although certain economic collaboration and 
integration between Japan and its adjacent Northeast Asian states are found, the 
political hitches between China and Japan, and between North Korea and Japan 
remain unsettled, while regarding the political and psychological aspects, China and 
South Korea are skeptical about Japan’s leadership because of historical context of 
anti-Japanese resentment of China and South Korea in the interwar period and 
Abe’s ruling, that means, the political impediment will be sustained if China and 
Japan failed to settle their political disparities and collaborate together to build a 
trilateral leadership model with ASEAN to realize an ASEAN Economic 
Community, so deprived of a favorable political atmosphere, economic 
collaboration will only be maintained in the short term (S. P. Kim). 
 
Therefore, the success of ASEAN regionalism depends on the extent of political 
determination of ASEAN Ten Plus Three to work out the idea of economic 
integration for the region because the key element falls on the political will of China 
and Japan to collaborate with each other in community building in political areas, 
just like the example of EU model of Germany and France in sharing of power and 
leadership (S. P. Kim).  
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Unlike economic issues, which can be settled by applying the win-win solution to 
the agreement of the desires of both states, political nationalism is a two-edged 
sword, which can either foster the unification of a nation and nurture the sense of 
patriotism for the formation of a nation, or implant a destructively influential basis 
in arguments over a territory or sovereignty, and even armed conflicts and territorial 
interventionism, for example, this can be visualized by the frequent political 
ambiguity in Sino-Japanese relationship due to the escalating of nationalism of both 
states: political matters like sovereignty arguments can be lengthy, which can be 
illustrated by the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes over the Diaoyu islands in 
Chinese or Senkaku islands in Japanese, and also the Spratly islands disputes in the 
South China Sea containing six competing states, so the construction of an ASEAN 
Economic Community imbeds severe political and security perils (S. P. Kim).  
 
Amongst these perils, the more challenging ones are a potential war over the Taiwan 
Strait because of the mounting centrifugal independence propensity in Taiwan after 
the election of the first female president Tsai Ing-wen; proliferation of weapon of 
mass destruction in North Korean; a breaking point in the Spratly Islands chain in 
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the South China Sea armed conflict over the scramble of maritime and natural 
resources, such as oil and gas, implying that each of the above stated possible 
political and security perils can generate tension among the states and prohibit the 
achievement of the ASEAN member states to construct a sustainable economic 
community in the region (S. P. Kim).  
 
Empirically, unlike in the EU, which offered a unique passport or autonomy of 
mobility as the European Schengen, few rules straightforwardly focus on the 
residents of ASEAN, excluding the 30-day free visa; fundamentally, states are still 
influenced by the Westphalia standard of global order, which nation-states are the 
key international actors, so a greater sense of “nationality” instead of “regionality” 
is generated among the residents in regional institution, denoting that the formation 
of regional identity is hampered by the notion of the nation-state in the 
contemporary global order since the identity of a regional community will 
persistently outshine the identity of a state (Masaya).  
 
Since the state leaders tend to craft their own domestic belief of all in its terrain, 
like national history books, national language and national schooling structure, 
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which in turn formulates national features to shape the identity of a national resident, 
because a shared state language is regarded as a solid groundwork in forming a 
community’s identity, the effort to establish a common language in ASEAN will be 
undermined, even though English has normally been utilized in their interactions in 
ASEAN, the practice is confined to elite groups merely (Masaya). The historical 
context of Indonesia displays a precise nationalistic perception and tiny information 
about ASEAN, demonstrating that if the education of the states for the individuals 
in its terrain concentrates on the past of their own nation, like Indonesia or 
Cambodia, neglecting the past of Southeast Asia as a whole, the forming of a 
ASEAN identity will be extremely difficult because an over-nationalistic method 
will outline their norm, ideas, and their national identity undermines the 
significance of their regional identity, so the sense of belonging to Southeast Asia 
will be minimized (Masaya). As a result, merely the eagerness of the state and the 
residents can change the situation by forgoing over-nationalistic attitudes with a 
more regional focus, taking ASEAN to the groundwork (Masaya). 
 
Recommendations for ASEAN to Enhance its Centrality in driving East Asia 
Regionalism 
 
In order to maintain its centrality in driving regionalism in East Asia, and further 
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its positions in the financial cooperation, infrastructure investments and initiatives, 
and political-security cooperation, it is paramount for the ASEAN countries to first 
stimulate local economic growth as an effort to strengthen its economy, most 
importantly the upcoming ASEAN Economic Community, which requires that all 
ASEAN leaders to have the tenacity in committing political willingness to create a 
single market and production base for manufacturing, to capture the opportunity 
and the world’s manufacturing powerhouse China is striving to move up the value 
chain by exiting low-value high labor manufacturing. For the time being, ASEAN 
countries are recommended to invest significantly in combating local corruption 
that clouds the domestic political stability, while on the economic front aim to 
eliminate tariffs and trade barriers.  These measures will result in some very 
positive outcome for the ASEAN countries, of equal importance, below are a few 
of the expected benefits that the recommendations will bring: 
(1) Narrowing the economic gap with the +3 countries will only serve to 
enhance the credibility of the ASEAN countries in terms of rapid economic 
resilience and economic growth in tandem of global economic being 
stagnant.   
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(2) Economic developments almost guarantee a steady inflow of foreign direct 
investments from other countries and thus acts as a prevention against the 
+3 countries, in particular China from leveraging its economic power and 
influence to prevent ASEAN countries from true integration.  In simple 
words, this will prevent the ASEAN countries from having to accept harsh 
economic concessions from the economic big brothers.   
(3) With fast economic growth, as the world has witnessed happened in China 
in the past two decades, ASEAN countries can increase towards its real GDP 
growth, and to invest heavily into regional physical infrastructures which 
will in turn promote trade.   
(4) In addition to focus heavily on economic growth, ASEAN member 
countries are also recommended to invest into its human capital. At the 
moment the vast majority of the population are still relatively un-educated 
and thus are trapped into performing low value-added jobs. To solve this 
problem, ASEAN should accelerate the investments into education through 
providing more state sponsored scholarships, mutual exchange of 
government officials, hosting period conferences etc. Also, they should 
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work more closely with Northeast Asia countries to learn from the rich 
experiences. 
Finally, although ASEAN seems to have a lesser role in developing the EAFTA, 
with the continuous investment in economic capacities and credibility, especially 
towards the successful implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community, 
which is regarded as the correct way to maintain relationship and trust between 
them and Japan and China. By successfully doing so, it is not difficult for ASEAN 
to further deepen its centrality in driving regionalism in a region that has so many 
unfilled promises. 
 
Comparison with the EU 
At the above sessions, we have generally agreed that ASEAN only has limited effect 
in successfully driving regional integration. In order for ASEAN to further facilitate 
regional integration, it can learn from the EU, which has been considered as one of 
the largest, most mature and successful regional communities in the world. This 
section will explore ways in which ASEAN could strengthen its regional 
cooperation by referring to the cooperation model of EU.  
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European Union and Regional Integration                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The idea of creating a regional community in European was first suggested by the 
British President Winston Churchill in 1946, in which he mentioned that only to 
establish a “kind of United States of Europe” can prevent the continent from further 
chaos after the Second World War. In 1950, the French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman proposed to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
with Germany to prevent further war between the two countries. On 18 April 1951, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed Treaty 
of Paris, the ECSC was formally established. In 1957, the six countries signed the 
Treaty of Rome to create the European Economic Community (EEC), or ‘Common 
Market’. In 1965, the Merger Treaty was signed to combine the executive bodies of 
the ECSC, European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the EEC into a 
single institutional structure, which is commonly regarded as the beginning of 
modern EU. Following then, the Single European Act was signed in 1986 to allow 
the free-flow of trade across EU borders and create the “Single Market”. The 
“Single Market” has been completed in 1993 with the freedom movement of goods, 
services, people and money. Member states then signed the Maastricht Treaty in 
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1993, which aimed at creating economic and monetary union for all EU states 
except the United Kingdom and Denmark by 1999. Euro was virtually born in 1999 
and started to circulate in 2002. The terrorist attack in the United States in 2001 and 
financial crisis in 2008 have brought UN member states closer together to fight 
crime and cooperate on economic development.  (European Union) 
 
There are five key institutions in the EU, include the European Parliament which 
composed of representative elected by EU member states; the European Council 
which represents the government of the member states and set the agenda of the EU; 
the Commission which responsible for launching and executing legislations; the 
Court of Justice which responsible for law compliance and the Court of Auditors 
which responsible for account auditing. For economic and monetary policies, there 
are the European Investment Bank and the European Central Bank to monitor the 
monetary policy in Euro zone. (European Union) 
 
Develop a “Common Identity” to Facilitate Regional Integration 
According to constructivists, a common identity is a key factor to a successfully 
regional integration, this theory can also be applicable to EU. “Over the years, the 
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member states have continued to establish institutions and laws that push for 
European integration and unity. Norms of cooperation and common identity have 
driven EU policy.” (Swisa) EU member states signed the "Declaration on European 
Identity” at the Copenhagen Summit in 1973, where EU member states affirmed 
their determination to introduce the concept of European identity into their common 
foreign relations, promote a set of common values and principles, and a common 
awareness of the Community’s specific interests. According to the Declaration, 
member states also agreed to define the European Identity which involve 
“reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations as well as the 
degree of unity so far achieved within the Community”, “assessing the extent to 
which member states are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world 
and the responsibilities which result from this”, and “taking into consideration the 
dynamic nature of European unification”. (European Union) 
 
Apart from successful identity building campaign, another factor for the successful 
building of EU identity is due to member states’ learning experiences from previous 
favorable outcome from cooperation. From Checkel’s model, an actor’s decision of 
future interactions depends on how it learnt from prior relations with the institutions, 
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therefore, the outcome from previous interactions resulted in preference change of 
member states. The “preference change” can indeed reshape the identities and 
interest of member states. (Checkel, J) This learning and socialization process 
allows members states to cooperate as they have a common understanding of a 
problem. (Saurugger, S) 
 
With a common identity, the logic of appropriateness model can explain the success 
of EU in regional integration. The logic of appropriateness suggests that “human 
action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into 
institutions.” Actors are embedded in a social collectivity, follow rules which seem 
expected, legitimate, rightful, and natural to them. They seek to “fulfill the 
obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political 
community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions.” 
(James G. March and Johan P. Olsen) 
 
The sense and awareness of EU identity in member states has been very strong. As 
of Spring 2015, over 67% of citizens in EU member states feel that they are citizens 
of the European Union. (European Commission)  In contrast, the awareness of 
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ASEAN common identity has been relatively weak. According to a survey 
conducted by the ASEAN Secretariat in 2013, about 3/4 of people in ASEAN 
member states do not understand what ASEAN really is and its operating structure. 
Indeed, ASEAN also realized the importance of a regional common identity in the 
development of regional cooperation. According to the ASEAN Vision 2020 which 
set out in the ASEAN annual summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, “we  
envision  the  entire Southeast  Asia  to  be,  by  2020,  an  ASEAN  
community  conscious  of  its  ties  of  history, aware of its cultural heritage 
and bound by a common regional identity.” 
 
Building a common identity is a key factor of success in regional integration. EU 
realized the importance of common identity building in its early stage of 
development and member states worked to increase the awareness of its citizens on 
a common European identity. In addition, the long history of cooperation in EU also 
helped to shape the identity of citizens in member states. However, ASEAN seems 
lack of a common identity and this hinders the process of regional integration. In 
order to drive for further regional integration, ASEAN can learn from the successful 
experience of EU and develop common identity campaigns in the region to promote 
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an “ASEAN” common identity. 
 
Enhance the cooperation and operation model of ASEAN 
 
ASEAN, in order to operate more efficiently, can consider adopting some of the 
operating model in EU. EU has a well-developed and mature way of cooperation. 
Both intergovernmental and supranational cooperation exist in the institution. 
However, ASEAN, although has the intention to push for further regional 
integration and cooperation, its cooperation model is still only at the stage of 
intergovernmental cooperation.  
 
Intergovernmentalism refers to situation where states cooperate in a platform that 
does not hurt the sovereignty of each individual states. There is still an institution 
to maintain such community, however, the function of the institution is only 
assisting and facilitating member states’ discussion and responsible for daily 
operation. The institution does not have the authority to set rules and policies for 
member states and member states are not obligated to comply with the policies 
made by such institution. Member states in such institution cooperate in commonly 
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interested topics. In general, participating member states can exercise control to 
decide the scope and nature of the cooperation.  
 
Intergovernmental cooperation can be found in EU. Although the European Council 
set the agenda for EU as a whole, each individual member states are still in control 
and have their system of law. ASEAN is still at the intergovernmental stage, 
decisions made by member states are based on consultation and consensus, rather 
than authority; and decisions made by ASEAN are also not binding. According to 
Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter, “decision making in ASEAN shall be based on 
consultation and consensus; where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN 
Summit may decide how a specific decision can be make; in the case of a serious 
breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN 
Summit for decision.” (ASEAN) 
 
Supranationalism suggests the community exists above the states level and have 
power above its member states. The community can make policies and laws for the 
benefits of its member states and impose to all states members. Member states 
worked together, and individual states do not have power to have complete control 
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on project developments. In some cases member states would have to act against 
their actual preferences as they do not have power to hinder decisions. This 
supranational institution structure led member states from the stage of inter-state 
cooperation to integration. This process may result in reduce in national sovereignty 
in certain extents.  
 
Some of the institutions in EU, such as the European Parliament and the European 
Council are examples of supranational institutions. The European Council set the 
agenda for the whole EU, and the European Parliament has partial legislative power 
in which laws and policies agreed by the representatives at the European Parliament 
have to be implemented on all EU member states. The supranational nature of these 
institutions in the EU is one of the key factors driving regional integration and 
regionalism in EU, as these institutions can ensure that all EU member states act in 
the same direction.  
 
Unlike EU, supranational institutions do not exist in ASEAN; the cooperation of 
ASEAN still remains at the intergovernmental stage. The initial design of ASEAN 
is not to develop into a supranational institution but mainly serve as a discussion 
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forum for member states to discuss on mutually concerned issues. (DOSCH) As 
stated in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN member states “are determined 
to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the 
ideals and aspirations of their peoples” (ASEAN) According to Article two of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 1976, “the right of every 
State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or 
coercion”, and ; “non-interference in the internal affairs of one another” are two 
of the fundamental principles of ASEAN. (ASEAN) As suggested by Bellamy and 
Drummond, “Despite the fact that the Association has made no attempt to define 
what it means by ‘interference’, regional practice prior to the mid 1990s suggests 
that it was construed as a continuum of involvement in the domestic affairs of states 
that ranged from the mildest of political commentary through to coercive military 
intervention”. (BELLAMY, A. J. and C. DRUMMOND) 
 
The non-interference principle of the ASEAN would hinder the organization from 
further integration as it would stop the kind of cooperation which would upset 
domestic governance of the member states. As the Former Prime Minister of 
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Malaysia, Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi stated in a sub-forum “ASEAN 
Community: A Major Milestone for Asian Integration” of the Boao Forum for Asia 
2015 that the ASEAN Community is different from the European Union. EU 
adopted further unity, while ASEAN has been working closely to strengthen 
regionalism, rather than weaken the sovereignty of Member States. It is not 
expected that ASEAN will be a centralized bureaucracy and this framework will 
not be changed in the short term.  (Phoneix Finance) However, recently, the non-
interference policy in ASEAN seems to be vacillated due to several regional affairs 
in the area. For example, in the issue of Myanmar’s abysmal treatment of its 
Rohingya population, there has been international pressure demanding that ASEAN 
should help in resolving the issue, which resulted in Thailand handing over 
suspected leaders of several human-trafficking syndicates to Malaysia. Former 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad also argued that “the ASEAN policy 
of non-interference should be put aside when it involved mass killing”. Singapore 
Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong said “ASEAN countries could work together, 
influence and encourage each other – but old arguments still die hard. He stressed 
the group could not solve all the problems nor compel any member to act in a 
certain way.”  (Luke Hunt) The recent development of the issue in Myanmar 
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shown that indeed there are possibility in which ASEAN countries can work 
together and influence each other on important issues and developments.  
 
In comparison, EU is far more politically integrated as ASEAN. EU has 
supranational bodies with set the agenda for the whole region. Due to the non-
interference principle of the ASEAN, supranational bodies do not exist in the 
institution; there is no formal mechanism or channels for political integration. 
Regional cooperation relies heavily on inter-state cooperation and communication 
between member states. Referring to the example of the Myanmar issue, ASEAN 
countries could consider working more closely and influence each other on 
important regional issues and developments. 
 
Explore a new model of economic cooperation 
 
Although both EU and ASEAN seek to further integrate their economy, the 
cooperation model of the two institutions varies. Since the establishment of Euro in 
1999, 19 of the 28 member states have adopted the Euro as of 2016. The European 
Central Bank has been responsible for the interest rate setting and money supply 
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control for Euro. The Economic and Monetary Union of the European Commission 
has been responsible for the coordination of economic and fiscal policies, a 
common monetary policy, and a common currency in the EU. The coordination of 
fiscal and monetary policy include three aspects, first, the coordination of fiscal and 
tax policies between EU and member states; second, the coordination of EU 
monetary policies; and third, the coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. 
(European Commission) 
 
The coordination of fiscal policy mainly reflected in the fiscal convergence, and to 
meet EU fiscal discipline, which is to control the deficit rate at below 3% and debt 
burden rate at below 60%. EU member states have achieved tax convergence in 
tariff, added-value tax, consumption tax, company tax, social security tax and 
coordination in financial tax system and tax evasion. The coordination of EU 
monetary policies has been mainly operated by the European Central Bank. There 
are Governing Council, which participated by Presidents of Euro Zone central 
banks; General Council, which also involve Presidents of non-euro zone central 
banks; and Executive Board, which responsible for daily operation. The European 
Central Bank responsible for setting monetary and financial policies of the Euro 
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Zone, and the Central Banks of individual states will implement these policies. The 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies refers to the match in fiscal and 
monetary policies to maintain a stable exchange rate and price in member states, 
and also to promote full employment and economic growth. (European Commission) 
To a large extent that the economic integration of the EU enables the region to 
operate as a single market with common economic policies. 
 
The cooperation in the ASEAN Economic Community has not been as highly 
integrated as EU. ASEAN has established the ASEAN Free Trade Area, in which 
member states have lowered the intra-regional tariffs through the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme. Tariff of more than 99% of the product in the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme Inclusion List have been lowered to 
0-5%. (ASEAN) ASEAN also seeks to continue on regional economic integration, 
as stated in the develop plan of the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN 
member states aim to develop capital markets, financial services, capital accounts 
and the potential of currency cooperation. There is the ASEAN Economic Ministers, 
which held annually for member states to discuss and plan for regional economic 
cooperation.  
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In comparing the model of economic cooperation between EU and ASEAN, EU has 
a hierarchical approach through supranational institutions, the European Central 
Bank and the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Commission to set 
the agenda for economic policies in EU. While in ASEAN, economic policies are 
decided by each individual member states, ASEAN only serve as a platform for 
member states to discuss and get general consensus on regional cooperation.  
 
To be inclusive to various policies model in ASEAN member states 
 
Differences between ASEAN and EU also exist in the variance in cultural, policies, 
economic and ethnic identities of its member states. Due to the cultural diversity in 
Asia in terms of living standards, level of economic development and moral values, 
it is difficult for ASEAN to achieve the high level of regional cooperation and 
integration as the EU. For example, 90% of Indonesian is Muslim, while 80% of 
Philippines are Roman Catholic and 95% of Thai are Buddhist. (Vinayak HV, Fraser 
Thompson and Oliver Tonby) Apart from this, the differences in population, 
geographic location and area, education level of citizens in ASEAN member states 
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also hinders the regional integration. In addition, ASEAN member states have long 
history of territorial dispute. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam all 
claims to have sovereignty over the South China Sea. In contrast, EU member states 
have similar level of economic development, geographic location and cultural 
values, which facilitate the cooperation between member states and reduce conflicts 
posed from cooperation. 
 
Political Systems in ASEAN member states 
County Government System 
Singapore Unitary, parliamentary, constitutional republic 
Philippines Unitary presidential constitutional republic 
Indonesia Unitary presidential constitutional republic 
Myanmar Unitary parliamentary republic 
Malaysia Federal parliamentary democracy under an elective 
constitutional monarchy 
Thailand Constitutional monarchy under military junta 
Cambodia Unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy 
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Brunei Unitary Islamic absolute monarchy 
Laos Marxist-Leninist one-party state 
Vietnam Socialist one-party state 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat  
 
Unlike most EU member states are under the democratic political system, the 
political system of ASEAN member states varies. Singapore, Philippines and 
Indonesia have a democratic or constitutional government system, while Malaysia, 
Brunei, Cambodia and Thailand have a system of monarchy, besides, Laos and 
Vietnam have a communism system. (Jon Lunn and Gavin Thompson ) In order to 
cooperate smoothly in ASEAN, ASEAN member states should be inclusive to the 
different political systems, religious and cultural value of each member. 
 
To have consensus on regional economic development goals 
 
Unlike ASEAN, EU member states have compatible level of economic 
development, 26 out of 28 member states are countries with very high level of 
human development, and the other two member states are countries with high level 
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of human development. (United Nations) The largest single expansion of the EU 
took place in 2004 when the “A10” countries, including Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia joined the EU. However, most of these “A10” countries had huge 
differences in economic development with the existing EU members, the EU 
utilized the Cohesion Fund to reduce economic and social disparities and to 
stabilize the economies of EU member states. (European Union) The compatible 
level of economic development enables EU member states to have a common 
interest in economic cooperation and development, and thus strengthening their 
motivation for regional cooperation.  
 
Gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), at current prices (nominal), 
in US dollars and United Nations Human Development Index in EU 
Country 
GDP per capita 
in 2014 
HDI in 2014 
Luxembourg 116,752 0.892 (Very high human development) 
Denmark 61,885 0.923 (Very high human development) 
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Sweden 57,557 0.907 (Very high human development) 
Ireland 54,374 0.916 (Very high human development) 
Netherlands 52,249 0.922 (Very high human development) 
Austria 51,183 0.885 (Very high human development) 
Finland 50,451 0.883 (Very high human development) 
Germany 47,201 0.916 (Very high human development) 
Belgium 47,164 0.890 (Very high human development) 
France 45,384 0.888 (Very high human development) 
Italy 35,512 0.873 (Very high human development) 
Spain 30,113 0.876 (Very high human development) 
Malta 24,314 0.839 (Very high human development) 
Slovenia 24,211 0.880 (Very high human development) 
Cyprus 23,955 0.850 (Very high human development) 
Greece 22,318 0.865 (Very high human development) 
Portugal 21,748 0.830 (Very high human development) 
Estonia 19,777 0.861 (Very high human development) 
Czech Republic 18,985 0.870 (Very high human development) 
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Slovak Republic 18,480 0.844 (Very high human development) 
Lithuania 16,476 0.839 (Very high human development) 
Latvia 16,145 0.819 (Very high human development) 
Poland 14,330 0.843 (Very high human development) 
Croatia 13,624 0.818 (Very high human development) 
Hungary 13,154 0.828 (Very high human development) 
Romania 10,161 0.793 (High human development) 
Bulgaria 7,648 0.782 (High human development) 
Source: International Monetary Fund Database and United Nations Human 
Development Index 
 
In contrast, the economic environment of ASEAN member states varies; ASEAN 
contains economically advanced countries, such as Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, 
and developing countries, such as Myanmar, Lao and Vietnam.  According to the 
table below, the GDP per capita of ASEAN member states varies. The International 
Monetary Fund states that Singapore ranked 6 in terms of Nominal GDP per capita 
worldwide in 2015. (International Monetary Fund) The GDP per capita of 
Singapore is about 44 times higher than that of Myanmar. The GDP per capita in 
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Singapore even surpasses some of the advanced economies such as the United 
States and Canada. (Vinayak HV, Fraser Thompson and Oliver Tonby) ASEAN 
contains member states with very high human development, such as Singapore and 
Brunei; high human development such as Malaysia and Thailand, medium human 
development such as Philippines, Vietnam and Lao; and low human development 
such as Myanmar. (United Nations) The standard deviation in average incomes 
among ASEAN countries is more than seven times that of EU member states. 
(Vinayak HV, Fraser Thompson and Oliver Tonby) Due to the huge variance on 
economic development between member states, there is a lack of common interests 
and census between member states. Economically advanced countries such as 
Singapore and Brunei are more interested to develop trade and service sector 
industries, while less economically developed countries such as Lao and Myanmar 
are more eager to develop their manufacturing sector and infrastructure 
development. 
 
Gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), at current prices (nominal), 
in US dollars and United Nations Human Development Index in ASEAN 
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Country GDP per 
capita in 2014 
HDI in 2014 
Singapore       56,287  0.912 (Very high human development) 
Brunei Darussalam       41,424  0.856 (Very high human development) 
Malaysia       10,784  0.779 (High human development) 
Thailand        5,436  0.726 (High human development) 
Indonesia        3,901  0.684 (Medium human development) 
Philippines        2,816  0.668 (Medium human development) 
Viet Nam        2,055  0.666 (Medium human development) 
Lao PDR        1,730  0.575 (Medium human development) 
Myanmar        1,278  0.536 (Low human development) 
Source: ASEAN Macroeconomic Database and United Nations Human 
Development Index 
 
Apart from the huge difference in economic development among member states, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement may pose a further threat to regional 
integration brought by the ASEAN Economic Community. 12 Asia Pacific 
countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement on 4 February 
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2016 in Auckland, New Zealand. Four ASEAN member states, including Brunei, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam also joined the TPP. Features of the TPP include 
providing a comprehensive market access, facilitating cross-border integration, 
addressing new trade challenges, and providing a platform for regional integration. 
With the new and high standards for trade and investment in Asia Pacific brought 
by the TPP, the ultimate goal for the TTP is to “bring open trade and regional 
integration across the region.” (United States Trade Representative) 
 
The inclusion of only part of the ASEAN member states into the TPP will increase 
the economic development gaps among member states and result in growing 
negative sentiment among ASEAN leaders. As the trade and investment 
opportunities will move away from non-participating TPP states to member states 
joined the TPP. This occurs as TPP offers participating states a comprehensive 
market access, such as lower barriers for foreign investment. As a result, the TPP is 
expected to boost the economic development of participating ASEAN member 
states and widen the gap of economic development among ASEAN member states. 
Moreover, as only part of ASEAN member states have been invited to join the TPP, 
it will increase the negative sentiment among ASEAN leaders, For example, 
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Philippines' Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima stated that "If there's a lag between 
the joining of the others in a high-quality agreement such as TPP, there can be 
resentment, especially as we continue to integrate." (Pennington) 
 
As EU member states have similar level on economic development, it is easier for 
them to come to consensus on economic issues and have common directions in 
economic development. Apart from that, the Cohesion Fund of the EU is an 
effective measure to reduce economic and social disparities and to stabilize the 
economies of EU member states. ASEAN member states, due to their huge variance 
on economic development, member states usually have varies set of economic 
priorities and agendas. ASEAN could learn from EU to have a Cohesion Fund 
measure to boost the economy of less-developed economies in ASEAN. Without a 
similar level of economic development, it is difficult for ASEAN member states to 
have a common interest in regional economic development, and therefore, it is 
difficult for ASEAN member states to be highly integrated. 
 
To have a Leading Role in ASEAN 
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German and France have served a leading role in EU, to strive for both long term 
and short term stable development of the regional, while also maintain their own 
competitive advantages at the same time. Apart from German and France as leading 
countries in the EU, other EU member states can also negotiate and discuss on 
mutually concerned topics. In contrast with the EU, there are no leading countries 
or axis in ASEAN. As the leadership role is absent in ASEAN, none of the member 
states can coordinate settlement of disputes and handling problems when conflicts 
or problems raised in the community. In addition, as a leadership role is absent in 
ASEAN, common goals and agenda are not very clear during discussions and 
negotiations.  
 
Although Periodical leadership sometimes exists in ASEAN, it lacks a potential 
leader. Periodical leadership refers to leadership is attached to individuality or 
charisma. Some notable leaders of ASEAN, such as Indonesia’s President Suharto, 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammad once demonstrated periodical leadership in ASEAN. (Rattanasevee) 
However, ASEAN is lacking a potential leader, Singapore, although has the highest 
economic level (GDP per capita of $56, 287 in 2014) among ASEAN member states， 
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consist a population of only 5.5 million and geographic area of 278 sq mi. It is 
difficult for Singapore to take the leading role in ASEAN as such a small country. 
Indonesia, as a big country in ASEAN, has a population of 255 million and 
geographic area of 735,358 sq mi. However, its economic development (GDP per 
capita of $3,901 in 2014) ranks only the 5th among ASEAN member states. Thailand, 
with a population of 68 million, geographic area of 198, 115 sq mi and GDP per 
capita of $5,436 in 2014, has weak national power and seems incapable to take up 
a leading role in ASEAN. (The World Bank) Without a leading role, it is very 
difficult to get the consensus from all member states on important regional issues 
and set the agenda for regional development, therefore, ASEAN should set up a 
system to establish a leading role in the institution. 
 
Areas that ASEAN could refer to EU 
 
EU and ASEAN share similar idea of promoting regional cooperation and boosting 
regional growth. In order for ASEAN to further facilitate regional integration, it can 
learn from the European Union (EU), which has been considered as one of the 
largest, most mature and successful regional communities in the world.  
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ASEAN could learn from EU to develop a common identity in the region in order 
to promote regional integration. According to constructivist, a common identity of 
EU is a key to the successful regional integration of EU. EU has identity building 
campaign at the early stage of development, 67% of EU member states citizen feel 
that they are “EU citizens” while over 3/4 of ASEAN member states citizen do not 
know what ASEAN is about. The long history of cooperation in EU also helped to 
shape the identity of citizens in member states. However, ASEAN seems lack of a 
common identity and it hinders the process of regional integration. 
 
Despite the non-interference principle in ASEAN, ASEAN member states could 
still explore the possibility to work more closely and influence each other on import 
issues. In view of EU, it is highly politically integrated, it has supranational bodies 
like the European Parliament to set the agenda for the whole region. While due to 
the non-interference principle of the ASEAN, a supranational body is absent in the 
institution, there is no formal mechanism or channels for political integration. 
Regional cooperation relies heavily on inter-state cooperation and communication 
between member states. In terms of model of economic cooperation, EU has a 
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common currency and also has supranational institutions, such as the European 
Central Bank and the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Commission, 
to set the agenda for economic policies and integration in EU. While economic 
cooperation in ASEAN were still at the intergovernmental level, there is no 
alignment in economic policies and ASEAN only serve as a platform for member 
states to discuss and get general consensus on regional cooperation. Referring to 
the incident in Myanmar, there are possibilities in which countries could work 
closely together on critical issues, ASEAN should further explore the possibility of 
influencing each other on setting important regional agendas. 
 
The economic, political, cultural between member states are also essential elements 
for the success of regional cooperation. In view of the huge variance on economic 
development, political system and cultural ideologies in ASEAN member states, 
ASEAN members should be inclusive to different culture and ideologies to 
cooperate closely. Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia have a democratic or 
constitutional government system, while Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia and Thailand 
have a system of monarchy, besides, Laos and Vietnam have a communism system. 
Economically, ASEAN has highly developed economy like Singapore and Brunei 
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and developing states like Laos and Myanmar. Due to their huge difference in the 
levels and stages of development, ASEAN member states usually have varies set of 
economic priorities and agendas. Therefore, without a common interest, it is 
difficult for ASEAN member states to be highly integrated. ASEAN could learn 
from EU to have a Cohesion Fund measure to boost the economy of less-developed 
economies in ASEAN, with similar level of economic development, it would be 
easier for member states to have common interests in setting the regional 
developmental agenda. Moreover, lacking a leading role in ASEAN also hinders its 
developmental agenda. German and France have served a leading role in EU, to 
strive for both long term and short term stable development of the regional. 
 
Referring to the EU, an alignment in economic policies is one of the key factors in 
promoting regional integration. With the European Central Bank and the Economic 
and Monetary Union of the European Commission, the economic policies of EU 
member states are moving in the same direction. With the same economic policies 
and system, it is much easier for member states to cooperate. ASEAN does not have 
such hierarchical approach through supranational institutions regarding its 
economic policies. Due to the non-interference principle of ASEAN, the 
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cooperation between member states should not affect the sovereignty of each 
individual members, therefore, it is hard for ASEAN to have any supranational 
bodies to set economic agenda. However, ASEAN can allow a free flow of capital 
account, which will further enhance the economic integration of member states. As 
most ASEAN member states are still developing countries, there is strong demand 
for infrastructure developments. Further relaxation on intra-regional flow of trade, 
service and capital can boost ASEAN economic growth, promote employment 
opportunities and regional integration. Further to the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement which has been established at an aim to lower the tariff on intra-regional 
trade, ASEAN should consider relaxing the flow of service, human capital and 
capital accounts for the next stage of cooperation.  
 
Conclusion  
To sum up, to a smaller extent ASEAN has succeeded in driving economic 
regionalism because the fundamental barriers, such as the lack of mass support, the 
saliency of national interests, socioeconomic heterogeneity and the variance in 
identity, cannot be removed. 
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Albeit it’s long tradition as an established regional institution, it is mostly because 
of historical animosities, mutual distrust and fierce economic competition amongst 
Northeast Asian countries, that ASEAN has found a niche to survive and acted as a 
major balance of power, while being influential in the formation of other regional 
infrastructure such as the East Asian Summit; however, its economic achievements 
fail far short of its intended goals, indeed as of today, ASEAN countries’ economy, 
with the exception of Singapore and Indonesia, remained to be amongst lowest in 
the region and to a certain extent one of the lowest in the global economy. Myanmar 
only recently adopted a more open economy; Vietnam is still engaged in lower 
value economic activity (e.g. low cost manufacturing) Laos, Thailand and other 
member states are largely being by-passed by other regional and global hegemons 
when East Asian regional interests are at stake. With deep cultural differences, 
vastly different political systems and varying stages of economic development, the 
ASEAN was not able to achieve or drive regionalism to the level experienced by 
the EU. Although not without its merits and indeed in the driver’s seat in a lot of 
issues, there are certain recommendations made by this research team to further 
strengthen ASEAN’s centrality.  
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In some areas, ASEAN can learn from EU for further promoting regional 
integration. EU and ASEAN share similar idea of promoting regional cooperation 
and boosting regional growth. EU has its unique governance structure and 
cooperation model. When referring to EU to develop its regional integration, 
ASEAN can try to develop supranational institutions, get consensus on regional 
economic direction and increase the level of economic cooperation among countries. 
In the area of economic integration and cooperation, ASEAN could refer to the EU 
model of an alignment in economic policies. While we understand that due to the 
non-interference principle of ASEAN, it is hard for ASEAN to have any 
supranational bodies to set economic agenda. However, ASEAN can still consider 
allowing a free flow of capital account, further relaxation on intra-regional flow of 
trade, service and capital, human capital and capital accounts for the next stage of 
cooperation and economic integration.  
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